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I. INTRODUCTION
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. I is the $12 billion case. This unprec-
edented damage award, Texaco claims, is over forty times larger than
the largest private civil judgment ever upheld in any prior case of any
kind.2 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the
obscure and often misinterpreted Rooker-Feldman 3 doctrine did not
preclude a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin Pennzoil's enforcement of this state court
judgment and to reduce the amount of a supersedeas bond from $12
billion to $1 billion.' Unless the Supreme Court can somehow manip-
ulate this doctrine to preclude federal jurisdiction, however, the dis-
trict court properly entertained the suit, as Pennzoil, the federal court
defendant, failed to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata.5
The court of appeals based its holding upon two Supreme Court
cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 6 and District of Columbia Court of
1. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
2. Brief for Appellee at 3, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 85-1798 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1986).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-8.
4. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1157.
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
6. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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Appeals v. Feldman,7 as well as the statute these cases interpreted, 28
U.S.C. § 1257.8 Section 1257 dictates the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States to review state court judgments. Under
the traditional interpretation that courts have given the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine, the mere possibility that the Court will exercise its cer-
tiorari or appellate jurisdiction to review those claims already
adjudicated in a state's highest court in which a decision could be had,
precludes a lower federal court from considering an appeal of such
state court decisions.
The court of appeals avoided the doctrine's reach, however, find-
ing that Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal court from reviewing
only those claims actually raised in a prior state court proceeding. 9
This court's cursory treatment of Rooker-Feldman's scope made it
relatively easy for the district court to postpone the debilitating finan-
cial effect of the judgment on Texaco. An analysis of the doctrine's
policies, however, reinforces its applicability, and a survey of how
courts have construed it demonstrates that in this case the court used
it incorrectly.
The court of appeals failed to determine whether Texaco's fed-
eral claims were inextricably intertwined with those raised in state
court, nor did it discern whether Texas procedure provided any
means by which Texaco could have raised these claims while in state
court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine definitely mandates the latter
inquiry, and it may also require the former. In fact, under one reading
of the doctrine, it precludes a federal court from exercising jurisdic-
tion to consider any claim that a litigant could have raised in a prior
state court proceeding, whether or not that claim is inextricably inter-
twined with the claims and issues actually litigated."0 This interpreta-
7. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) reads:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
9. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
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tion gives the doctrine greater scope than traditional res judicata."
Courts historically have confused Rooker-Feldman with the
traditional and widely known preclusion principles, res judicata and
collateral estoppel. In fact, confusion abounds as to exactly what the
doctrine is, and an analysis of cases, statutes, and commentary reveal
numerous inconsistencies. This Note will explain that for the doc-
trine to serve the policies that the Supreme Court intended it to
address, the Court must explicitly articulate an additional inference as
of yet not attributed to the doctrine. 2 In addition, the Court must
decide whether the doctrine precludes Texaco and other state court
litigants from attaining federal jurisdiction over claims separate from
and not inextricably intertwined with actually litigated state court
claims,' 3 where that party procedurally could have raised the claim in
state court, such as Texaco's challenge to the constitutionality of the
Texas supersedeas bond.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the product of two negative
inferences derived from section 1257. The Supreme Court has
described this section as a limitation on its ability to review state court
judgments, as the Court may only review decisions from the "highest
state court."' 4 Consequently, because even the Supreme Court may
not review decisions from a lower state court, it naturally follows that
a federal district court may not entertain appeals from lower state
court judgments.' 5 While this point has great intuitive appeal given
that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, no court has articulated
that this inference actually flows from the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The policy behind this first component of the doctrine is to facilitate a
state appellate process free from federal interference.
The second inference, traditionally attributed to the doctrine, is
that once the highest state court has taken some form of action, only
the Supreme Court may hear an appeal. 6 In short, the second infer-
ence holds that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
judgments from a state's highest court.' 7 While this intimation his-
torically has been the only one attributed to Rooker-Feldman, courts
incorrectly have explained the need for this latter inference by citing
the policy justification for the former-an uninterrupted state appel-
11. See infra notes 170-88 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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late process."
The goal of this Note is to unravel the doctrine and to explain its
scope and purpose in the context of the Texaco case. In so doing, one
may reasonably reach the conclusion that the Court in both Rooker
and Feldman was simply wrong: Neither of those cases were exam-
ples of a federal district court acting as an "appellate" tribunal over
state court judgments. Those cases are little more than examples of
traditional res judicata, where a state court litigant failed to raise fed-
eral grounds for relief in state court, and consequently suffered the
penalty of locked federal courthouse doors. 19
II. THE Texaco v. Pennzoil CASE
In February 1984, Pennzoil brought suit against Texaco in Texas
state court for knowingly and intentionally interfering with Pennzoil's
pending agreement to acquire three-sevenths of Getty Oil's stock.
Four-and-one-half months of trial and thirty-five witnesses later, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Pennzoil, awarding it $11.12 billion
in damages.2 ° The trial judge denied Texaco's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), based on constitutional and
statutory grounds, 2' on the very same day that Texaco filed it, and
entered judgment in the full amount of the jury verdict, plus interest
18. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 139-69, 189-94 and accompanying text.
20. Pennzoil had negotiated to buy approximately three-sevenths of Getty's outstanding
shares for $110 per share. Getty eventually sold the stock to Texaco for $128 per share. The
jury found that Pennzoil was entitled to $7.53 billion as compensatory damages and $3 billion
as punitive damages, plus prejudgment interest and costs. This interest amounted to $625
million, from which the court subtracted approximately $34 million, according to a stipulation
filed by Pennzoil.
The judgment also provided that Pennzoil could recover post judgment interest at a rate
of 10% per annum until the judgment was paid. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at
1136-37. The amount of the judgment was based on evidence Pennzoil presented as to the cost
of replacing the oil reserves that Pennzoil would have acquired under the foiled agreement.
Brief for Appellant at 2, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 85-1798 (U.S. Sept. 5, 1986).
21. In Texaco's memorandum in support of its motion for j.n.o.v., it alleged claims that
the judgment of the Texas court:
(i) Impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, and therefore violates the commerce
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3, and frustrates the purposes of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781-78n (1982);
(ii) Conflicts with and is preempted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n(d), 78n(e) & 78bb (1982);
(iii) Changes the New York law of tortious inducement to breach of contract, and is
therefore in violation of the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; and
(iv) Violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, as it was obtained in a fundamentally unfair proceeding.
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 784
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
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and costs. 2
2
Recognizing that Texaco was now threatened with financial ruin,
and undoubtedly motivated by the astronomical amount of the judg-
ment, the trial judge attempted to preserve the status quo for as long
as his court had jurisdiction over the case.23 For the three-and-one-
half month period following the entry of the judgment, the court pro-
hibited Pennzoil from executing on it. The court also barred Texaco
from encumbering its assets except in the ordinary course of
business.24
Upon expiration of the trial court's jurisdiction, Texaco would
have been required to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $12
billion in order to stay the execution of the judgment during the
appellate process. 25 Otherwise, Pennzoil had state procedures avail-
able by which it could have acquired a lien on all of Texaco's property
in the state of Texas immediately upon the expiration of this "stand-
still" period.
26
22. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at A123-28, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No.
85-1798 (U.S. May 1, 1986).
23. The duration of the "stand-still" period is determined through application of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. Judgment was entered on Dec. 10, 1985. Texaco complied with the
requirement that a party must move for a new trial within 30 days after the judge has signed
the judgment. TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 329b(a) (Vernon 1985). The trial judge then had 75
days in which to rule on the motion, id. at r. 329b(c), or until Feb. 23, 1986. If the trial judge
had not ruled on the motion within that period, it would have been denied as a matter of law.
The trial judge retains jurisdiction over a case for 30 days after the denial of a motion. Id. at r.
329b(f). Therefore, if the trial judge in Texaco did not rule on the motion, the trial court
would have retained jurisdiction until March 25, 1986. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784
F.2d at 1137-38 n.3.
Texaco argues, however, that this "stand-still" period could potentially have been much
shorter than three and one-half months. Because the trial judge theoretically could have ruled
on Texaco's motion for new trial at anytime within the 75 day period, the trial court's
jurisdiction could have expired as early as Feb. 8, 1986, or approximately 2 months after the
entry of the judgment. Brief for Appellee at 4-5 n.9, Texaco (No. 85-1798).
24. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1137.
25. TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 364 (Vernon 1985) (current version at TEX. R. APP. P. ANN.
r. 47 (Vernon 1986)), provides in pertinent part:
(a) May suspend execution. Unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, an
appellant may suspend the execution of the judgment by filing good and sufficient
bond to be approved by the clerk, or making the deposit provided by Rule 14c,
payable to the appellee in the amount provided below, conditioned that the
appellant shall prosecute his appeal or writ of error with effect and, in case the
judgment of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals shall be against him, he
shall perform its judgment, sentence or decree and pay all such damages as said
court may award against him.
(b) Money Judgment. When the judgment awards recovery of a sum of money,
the amount of the bond or deposit shall be at least the amount of the judgment,
interest and costs.
26. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon 1983) provides that an abstract ofjudgment
presented by the judgment creditor, when properly recorded and indexed, "constitutes a lien
1987]
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Despite the judgment's protective provisions, Texaco immedi-
ately experienced adverse consequences.27 As a result, one week after
entry of the judgment, but during the stay of its execution, Texaco
sought a preliminary injunction in federal court against Pennzoil's
taking any action to enforce the Texas judgment 28 because it claimed
that it could not possibly meet the mandatory bond requirement.29
Texaco maintained that "it then stood on the brink of bankruptcy"
and that "[t]he company's viability was then measurable-not in
months-but in days (perhaps hours)."3
Texaco alleged in its amended complaint in federal district court
all of those claims raised in its motion for j.n.o.v. to the Texas trial
court,3 as well as two additional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 198332 not
presented to the Texas court. These latter constitutional grounds
were that the Texas lien and supersedeas bond provisions prevented
Texaco from effectively prosecuting an appeal through the Texas state
court system, and that consequently, the application of the bond
requirement violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the federal Constitution. 3 The United States District Court for the
on the real property of the defendant located in the county in which the abstract is recorded
and indexed."
27. "It's bonds were downgraded and its credit lines shrank. Unsecured borrowing became
unavailable and even secured financing uncertain. Suppliers, joint venturers, and purchasers of
Texaco assets shied away from dealing with it .... Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at
1139. In addition, Texaco stated that in the week following entry of the judgment, its ability to
obtain crude oil- "the lifeblood of Texaco's operations"-was jeopardized. Brief for Appellee
at 5, Texaco (No. 85-1798).
28. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, rev'd in part,
784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
29. There was little doubt that should Texaco be required to liquidate its assets it would
have been able to pay Pennzoil's judgment in full. At the time of the judgment, Texaco's
liquidation value was between $22 and $26 billion. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at
1155. Texaco claimed, however, and the court of appeals concurred, that enforcement of Rule
364, along with the simultaneous attachment of Texaco's property, would render Texaco
unable to finance its operations or obtain the credit necessary for its continued existence. Id. at
1152.
30. Brief for Appellee at 33, Texaco (No. 85-1798).
31. See supra note 21.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
33. The Texas constitution grants a right of appeal to all civil and criminal litigants. TEX.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 13, 19. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984); see also
Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. I, 4, 14 S.W. 303, 304 (1890) (a party's right to appeal is not
dependant upon his ability to give a bond to secure satisfaction of the judgment). At least in
criminal proceedings, federal due process requires that once a state has created the right of
[Vol. 41:627
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Southern District of New York granted Texaco's application for a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Texas judgment,
while at the same time requiring Texaco to post security in the sum of
$1 billion.34
Pennzoil challenged the district court's review of the Texas judg-
ment, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit implicitly held
that the doctrine of res judicata35 did not bar the federal district court
from reviewing the Texas judgment, because Pennzoil failed to raise
this affirmative defense in the district court.36 More significantly for
present purposes, the court of appeals explicitly held that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precludes federal court review only of those claims
actually raised in a state trial court.3 7
Despite the court's reference to much of the district court's deci-
sion as an "impermissible appellate review of issues that have already
been adjudicated by the Texas trial court,"3 it found that Rooker-
Feldman does not preclude a federal district court from exercising
jurisdiction over claims that were not raised in a prior state court
proceeding. 39 Under this reasoning, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did
not bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction over Texaco's
section 1983 claims not raised in state court;4 ° namely, that the appli-
cation of the Texas supersedeas bond and lien provisions deprived the
company of its constitutional rights to due process and equal protec-
tion.4' Consequently, the court of appeals did not have to address the
issue of whether or not Texaco could have raised these claims while
still in state court. Upon determining that Rooker-Feldman did not
foreclose federal review, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's order granting a preliminary injunction42 on the condition that
appeal, it must "offer each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits
of his appeal." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985).
34. The district court assumed that the benefit of the bargain that Pennzoil lost is
approximately $800 million. Added to this were interest, costs, and attorney's fees, which
together comprised the additional $200 million necessary to secure Pennzoil's claim. Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. at 261-62.
35. See infra notes 139-69 and accompanying text.
36. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1144.
37. Id. at 1143.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1144.
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
42. The court of appeals, upon finding federal jurisdiction to hear Texaco's challenge to
the constitutionality of the bond and lien provisions, held: Texaco's civil rights claims stated
the essential elements of an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Texaco's complaint
adequately alleged the first element of this claim; threatened deprivation of a constitutional
right. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1145. The second essential element of a
section 1983 action is whether conduct resulting in the deprivation of a federal right is fairly
1987]
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Texaco promptly and diligently prosecute its appeal in the Texas
appellate courts.43  Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2nd
Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE Rooker-Feldman DOCTRINE
A. The Rooker Decision
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,' the Rookers executed to Fidel-
ity Trust Company, as trustee, two warranty deeds to land. 45 They
claimed that Fidelity violated the trust agreement,46 but the Indiana
trial court entered judgment for the trust company, foreclosing the
mortgage and directing a sale of the property. 47 After the Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, the Rookers brought suit in
federal district court seeking a declaration that the state court judg-
ment violated the contract clause of the federal Constitution,48 as well
as the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.49 The district court dismissed the suit for lack of juris-
attributable to the state. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Because state
officials must participate in the enforcement of the state court judgment, this constitutes state
action for purposes of section 1983. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1146. Cf. Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to him
does not constitute state action even though the Uniform Commercial Code created his lien).
The court of appeals also held that the district court was not required to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction over claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Pullman abstention
doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from deciding difficult and unsettled questions of
state law, which a court necessarily must resolve before it can reach a substantial federal
question. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). The court of appeals
reasoned that because Texas has refused in the past to reduce the amount of the supersedeas
bonds required under Rule 364, there is no ambiguity as to what the state law is. Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1148. Abstention, as Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
dictates, is dependant upon the existence of three conditions: there must be (1) vital state
interests at stake, (2) state procedures available to provide an adequate opportunity for the
appellant to raise his federal claims in a state court, and (3) an ongoing state proceeding.
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1149. After finding that the first and third elements
were satisfied, the court of appeals found state court mandamus to be an inadequate state
remedy, and said that the trial judge would, in all probability, either deny the relief sought on
constitutional grounds or leave the constitutional issues undecided until his jurisdiction
expired. Id. at 1150-51.
Finally, the court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting Texaco preliminary injunctive relief. Texaco met its burden of showing irreparable
harm, as well as either probable success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits to make them fair grounds for litigation, plus a balance of hardships weighing
decidedly in Texaco's favor. Id. at 1152.
43. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1157.
44. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
45. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 185 Ind. 172, 173, 109 N.E. 766, 767 (1915).
46. Id. at 181, 109 N.E. at 768.
47. Id. at 182, 109 N.E. at 769.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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diction,5" and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, which held that the suit was not within the district
court's jurisdiction "as defined.by Congress."'" The Court, therefore,
sustained Fidelity's motion to affirm the district court's jurisdictional
dismissal.52
In essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine complements the prin-
ciple that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, by reason-
ing that "lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in
direct review of state court decisions."53 In Rooker, the Court
explained that if a lower state court decision was wrong, the judgment
would not be void, but rather it became "open to reversal ... in an
appropriate and timely appellate proceeding."54 As the Texaco court
described it, "[A]n inferior federal court established by Congress pur-
suant to Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution may not act as an appellate
tribunal for the purpose of overruling a state court judgment, even
though the judgment may rest on an erroneous resolution of constitu-
tional or federal law issues."55
The Court based the Rooker decision upon principles of statutory
construction and negative inference. Congress granted original juris-
diction to federal district courts under a variety of statutes, princi-
pally, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1343,56 and by inference, under
28 U.S.C. § 1257, exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to
review final judgments or decrees from the highest court of a state in
which a decision could be had.17 A commentator has interpreted
Rooker to stand for the proposition that Congress, in enacting section
1257, implicitly failed to bestow upon the lower federal courts the
50. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 413.
51. Id. at 414.
52. Id.
53. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296
(1970). For a discussion of the Feldman decision and its impact on the doctrine, see infra
notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
54. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 415. But see infra text accompanying notes
87-88.
55. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1142. A constitutionally required exception
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is habeas corpus, where a "single federal judge may overturn
the judgment of the highest court of a State." Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981).
56. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982).
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ... and is between-(l) citizens of different
states .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
Section 1343 of title 28, entitled "Civil rights and elective franchise," further sets out
circumstances under which district courts will have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1982).
57. See supra note 8.
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jurisdiction to review state court judgments.58
Federalism is an underlying policy behind the Rooker decision;
the continuance of a system of two distinct legal systems, each pro-
ceeding independently of the other, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter of federal questions raised in either the federal or state
court systems.59 In order "to prevent needless friction between state
and federal courts,"' 60 and to facilitate the deference necessary for this
bi-judicial system to function properly, Congress constructed "lines of
demarcation between the two systems" 61 through the enactment of
such jurisdictional statutes.62 Perhaps most persuasively, continuous
appeals to federal courts would likely destroy the finality of state
court decisions.63
Rooker also stems from the Court's longstanding view that state
courts are competent (as well as obligated) to adjudicate federal con-
stitutional claims.64 The doctrine assumes that it is necessary for a
state to have the opportunity to intelligently mediate federal constitu-
tional concerns with state interests, and that if a federal court disrupts
this process, it "prevent[s] the informed evolution of state policy by
state tribunals.
65
B. The Highest State Court Requirement
The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precludes federal review of Texaco's state claims
raised only in a state trial court. The court said that "[a]llowing
58. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal
Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1349 (1980) (limitation of original jurisdiction to federal
district courts is a statutory corollary of Congress's grant to the Supreme Court of exclusive
power to review state court judgments through section 1257).
59. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970).
60. Id. (citing Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940)).
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 8 & 56. The federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982),
which states that a federal court may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state
court, is another example of congressional intent to erect barriers between the state and federal
court systems. The Court, however, has held the statute inapplicable to civil rights actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
63. Chang, supra note 57, at 1350; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13
(1982) (conclusive carry-over effect should not be accorded a tentative judgment).
64. Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) ("Appellee is in truth urging us to base a
rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their constitutional
responsibilities. This we refuse to do."); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981)
(Despite state court differences of opinion as to how to interpret the Constitution, there is no
presumption that they are not doing their "'mortal best to discharge their oath of office.");
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 383 (1977) (In processing habeas corpus petitions, federal
judges must respect state judges' decisions.).
65. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979).
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lower federal courts to review the judgments of state lower courts is as
intrusive and as likely to breed antagonism between state and federal
systems as allowing federal court review of the judgments of the
states' highest courts."66 In interpreting the doctrine this way, the
court apparently discarded 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and the "highest state
court" requirement. The Texaco decision, as well as many earlier
interpretations of Rooker, have failed to examine the doctrine and its
policies in relation to the language of the statute.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine would seem to be triggered by the
requirement set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, that the Supreme Court
may review only those judgments or decrees rendered by the "highest
state court in which a decision could be had." Although in a great
majority of cases applying Rooker-Feldman, the party sought federal
relief only after resorting to the state court of last resort,6 7 federal
courts also have used Rooker-Feldman to preclude federal review of
an adverse lower state court decision.68 The federal court in Duke v.
Texas69 did exactly that, witholding jurisdiction on the ground that
the way was open for the plaintiffs "to assert their federal claims
through final decision by Texas courts and thereafter to seek review in
the Supreme Court under [28 U.S.C. § 1257]."' 0 In Duke, the state
trial judge issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the soon to be
66. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1142-43.
67. See, e.g., Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983) (California Supreme
Court denied petition for a writ of mandate); Friarton Estates Corp. v. City of New York, 681
F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982) (New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's staying
of its entire calendar); Dasher v. Supreme Ct. of Tex., 658 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.
1981) (Texas Supreme Court overruled motion for leave to file petition); Reynolds v. Georgia,
640 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981) (Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed trial court's granting of summary judgment); Turco v. Monroe County Bar
Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (New York Court of Appeals
dismissed appeal from an order disbarring petitioner); see also Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502
F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975) (New York Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal termination of a teacher's probationary appointment); Francisco Enters., Inc.
v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974) (California Supreme
Court denied petition for rehearing regarding the revocation of a liquor license); Brown v.
Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970) (Florida Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal of the denial of a state-provided transcript in a child custody
matter); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 955 (1956)
(South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of an optometrist's license).
68. See Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1210 (1984) (plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court after a lower state court imposed a lien
on their property); Rhoades v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal suit filed after
state trial court overruled a motion for new trial and the state court of appeals issued a
certificate of refusal to file the record on appeal); Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567 (9th Cir.
1973) (per curiam) (Rather than take an appeal from the judgment of the California municipal
court, the appellant brought a section 1983 action in federal district court.).
69. 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
70. Id. at 253. Along similar lines, the court intimated that a party must test the
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federal plaintiffs from entering a college campus.7' No state appellate
court had considered the injunction in Duke.
While the great majority of cases applying the doctrine have
done so only after action by the state's court of last resort, 72 non-
Rooker-Feldman cases interpreting which courts satisfy this require-
ment define it flexibly.73 State trial courts have, though infrequently,
satisfied the "highest state court" requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1257."4
In Largent v. Texas," the plaintiff was tried and fined $100 in a Texas
county court for violating an ordinance requiring a permit to sell
books. Texas law explicitly provided that no appeal lay from the
judgment of a county court.76 The Court held that because there is no
state method for reviewing this conviction, the appeal was properly
before it under section 1257's predecessor, section 237 of the Judicial
Code.77 Yet the Court has refused to assert jurisdiction under section
1257 where a party has failed to avail itself of remedies present within
the state court system,78 regarding the important purpose of the high-
est court requirement to be the prohibition of Supreme Court "inter-
ference with state proceedings when the underlying dispute may be
otherwise resolved.
' 79
The Court has recognized instances where the rule "ought not to
be administered in such a mechanical fashion because certain situa-
tions warrant a departure from the requirement of finality for federal
sufficiency of state remedies before seeking to invoke the assistance of the district court. Id. at
252.
71. Id. at 247.
72. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73. See Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What is Highest Court of State Within
Meaning of 28 USCS § 1257, Authorizing Supreme Court Review of Final Judgment of Highest
Court of State in Which Decision Could Be Had, 61 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1980).
74. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (granting certiorari to review an order
by a local magistrate who denied a motion to annul a previously issued search warrant which
was not appealable or reviewable under state law); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)
(Texas justice court held to be the highest court in which a decision could be had).
75. 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
76. Because Mrs. Largent was first convicted in a state corporation court, she appealed to
the County Court of Lamar County, Texas, which conducted a trial de novo. Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. at 419 n.2; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 876 (Vernon 1936). The Texas
statute also provided that the Court of Criminal Appeals may not consider any case where the
fine imposed does not exceed one-hundred dollars. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. at 421; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 53 (Vernon 1936).
77. For a brief history of the antecedents of this statute, see Annotation, supra note 73, at
948.
78. See Costarelli v. Massachussetts, 421 U.S. 193 (1975) (dismissing for want of
jurisdiction where a party could have attacked the constitutionality of a Massacussetts two-tier
trial court system by a motion to dismiss in the superior court); Hamerstein v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 341 U.S. 491 (195 1) (rejecting jurisdiction where the plaintiff could have obtained state-
court review of an adjudication by the California Superior Court).
79. Costarelli v. Massachussetts, 421 U.S. at 196.
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appellate jurisdiction."8 These are situations where the highest court
of a state has determined finally the federal issue present in a particu-
lar case, although further proceedings on other issues are pending in
lower state courts. The principal case articulating these exceptions to
section 1257's "highest state court" language is Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,81 which recognizes four situations 2 where the decision
on a federal issue is considered final for purposes of section 1257. In
those situations, Cox allows the Court to take jurisdiction without
awaiting the completion of additional proceedings anticipated in
lower state courts.83 The Court justified this broadening of the "high-
est court" requirement by pointing out that these categories do not
require the decision of other federal questions that may require subse-
quent review by the Court,84 and that immediate rather than delayed
review avoids "the mischief of economic waste and of delayed
80. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975) (citing Radio Station
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945)).
81. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
82. Cox outlined the four categories satisfying the highest state court requirement:
a) Cases where there are further proceedings yet to occur in the state courts, but where
the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained. Id. at 479.
See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (Although the state supreme court remanded
for a jury trial on the criminal complaint, the Court took jurisdiction because the appellant had
no defense other than his federal claim, and could not possibly prevail at trial on the facts or
any non-federal ground.). Id. at 217-18.
b) Cases in which the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the state will
survive and require deciding regardless of the outcome of future state court proceedings. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 480. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85 n. 1
(1963) (holding a new criminal trial on punishment only, and not guilt, reviewable because the
federal issue was separable); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945)
(federal issue adjudicated by state supreme court held reviewable despite a pending accounting,
on the theory that the accounting could not give rise to a federal question).
c) Cases where the federal claim had been decided fully with further proceedings on the
merits in the state courts still to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be
had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at
481. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S.
156 (1973) (Although the state supreme court remanded a case challenging the denial of an
application to the pharmacy board, the Court entertained the case on the premise that the
federal issue would not survive the remand, whatever the result of state administrative
proceedings.).
d) Cases where the state courts have decided finally the federal issue, and pending
proceedings might allow the party seeking review to prevail on the merits of a nonfederal
claim. In these cases, where reversal of the state court's ruling on the federal issue would
preclude further litigation, the Court has taken jurisdiction where a refusal to do so may
seriously erode federal policy. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 482-83.
83. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 477.
84. An example of a proceeding that may involve an interlocutory decision as to one
federal question, with another to be decided later, is eminent domain; where the federal
questions involve not only whether or not a taking has occurred, but also the question of just
compensation. Id. at 477-78 n.6.
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justice. '"85
Cox Broadcasting and its progeny8 6 provide little support for the
proposition that for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, the Texas trial
court in Texaco is the highest state court from which a decision could
be had, because in the Cox line of cases, a party at least had petitioned
the state's highest court to take some form of action.8 7 Texaco is the
first time the Court is being asked to apply Rooker-Feldman to bar
federal trial court jurisdiction of claims that should have been raised
in state court, where only a state trial court has heard them.
C. The Double Negative Inference
The primary policy that courts have attributed to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is to allow the state judicial process to proceed
absent federal interference.8 8 Yet, given the doctrine's traditional
scope, it is logically and sequentially inaccurate to cite its benefits as
inuring to lower state court proceedings. Because of the doctrine's
relationship with 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and the "highest state court"
requirement, its preclusive effect would seem to be activated only once
the state's highest court has rendered some type of decision. By the
time a state's highest court has considered a case-triggering Rooker-
Feldman-the doctrine's policy of uninterrupted state trials and
appeals already has been achieved.
The inference traditionally read into section 1257 by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is that Congress granted the Supreme Court exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review, through appeal or certiorari, judgments
from the highest state court.8 9 In response to the incongruity that
results when the inference fails to serve the policy, an additional infer-
ence must be integrated into the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to deter-
mine whether it may apply in Texaco.
In addressing the issue of whether a federal trial court's "collat-
eral review" of a state court judgment is contrary to the purpose of
85. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. at 124.
86. O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982); Minnick v. California Dep't. of Corrections,
452 U.S. 105 (1981); Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); American Export Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
87. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (court of
appeals issued a per curiam order denying petition for admission to bar); Florida State Bd. of
Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960 (1970) (denial of certiorari by Florida Supreme Court);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (Indiana Supreme Court affirmed judgment
of state circuit court). But see Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275
(1946) (citing Rooker in support of a finding of res judicata, where there was no action by any
state court whatsoever.).
88. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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Congress in providing for Supreme Court review, Professor Currie
surmised:
[T]he Supreme Court was chosen to review state court judgments
because only it had sufficient dignity to make federal review of
state courts reasonably palatable; that the highest-state-court
requirement was designed to preclude federal interference unless
and until state courts had a full opportunity to avoid that clash
[arising from federal review of state court judgments] . . ..
Therefore, the first negative inference to be read into Rooker-
Feldman is that because section 1257 is a limitation on even the
Supreme Court's ability to review state court judgments-Congress
having granted the Court jurisdiction to review only the highest state
court in which a decision could be had-lower federal courts must
similarly be restricted in order to accomplish the ideal of an uninter-
rupted state appellate process. Although cases decided under Rooker-
Feldman have not articulated this reading of the statute, the Court
has recognized that section 1257 is a limitation on its power to review
cases coming from state courts. 91
Consequently, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered by the highest
state court's taking action. Rather, the doctrine limits Supreme Court
and lower federal court interference with state proceedings from an
action's outset through the point in time when the highest state court
has spoken. At that point, the limitation on the Supreme Court is
removed and the "evil" that Rooker-Feldman was created to prevent
has been avoided., Once the limitation is removed, the second nega-
tive inference that courts historically have applied, takes effect.
Because the Supreme Court now has exclusive jurisdiction to enter-
tain appeals of state judgments, lower federal courts have no such
jurisdiction.92 Hence, an attempt by a federal district court to hear an
appeal of a state court judgment will, at all times, be precluded by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
IV. THE SCOPE OF Rooker-Feldman PRECLUSION
A. The Feldman Decision and Its Interpretation
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman 93 represents the
90. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 317, 323 (1978).
91. Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 620 (1981).
92. Without explaining the inconsistency between the policy of state appeals and the
highest state court requirement, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared that
district courts have no more power to review the decisions of lower state courts than those of
state supreme courts. See Gresham Park v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1234 n.14 (5th Cir. Unit B
Aug. 1981).
93. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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Court's most recent discussion of the Rooker doctrine. In Feldman,
the plaintiffs filed a petition with the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals94 seeking waiver of the District's bar requirement that appli-
cants must graduate from accredited law schools. Upon denial of the
petition, plaintiffs brought an action in federal district court alleging
constitutional violations not raised below, and seeking injunctive
relief.95
In Feldman, the Court reaffirmed the validity of Rooker, holding
that district courts have no jurisdiction "over challenges to state-court
decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if
those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitu-
tional."96 Pursuant to section 1257, an appeal may be had only in the
Supreme Court.
Feldman further defined the Rooker doctrine through its discus-
sion of whether Rooker bars federal review of claims that were not
raised in the state court, but which could have been. Rooker merely
stated that an action will be barred "if the constitutional questions
stated in the bill actually arose in the cause."'9 7 Similarly, the Court in
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers98 held that federal district courts do not have appellate jurisdic-
tion over federal questions "raised in state proceedings." 99 Feldman,
however, extended Rooker's reach at least to preclude federal district
court review of claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state
court's denial of a particular plaintiff's application for admission to
94. For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the term "highest court of a state" includes the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
95. Plaintiff Feldman sought a declaration that refusal to waive the rule violated the fifth
amendment to the Constitution and the Sherman Act, and also an injunction requiring the
defendants either to grant him immediate admission to the bar or to permit him to sit for the
bar examination as soon as possible. Plaintiff Hickey's complaint was identical to that of
Feldman's, except that he simply sought an order requiring the defendants to allow him to sit
for the bar examination at the earliest possible date. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 469 n.3.
96. Id. at 486.
97. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 415.
98. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
99. Id. at 296. Court of appeals cases pre-dating Feldman have applied this interpretation
of the scope of Rooker. See, e.g., Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974) (A direct suit against the state judiciary raising the very same
issues should be dismissed if the principle of comity is to have any meaning.); see also Jack's
Fruit Co. v. Growers Mktg. Serv., 488 F.2d 493, 494 (5th Cir. 1973) (district court is without
jurisdiction to review federal constitutional questions decided by state courts); Hanley v. Four
Corners Vacation Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973) (where issue of due
process actually has been litigated, the determination of that issue is res judicata; Rooker cited
as support); cf. Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 1977) (district court had jurisdiction
over original federal complaints alleging state law violations of the federal Constitution, which
were not merely proceedings seeking appellate review).
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the state bar.'°°
The Feldman Court then proposed that review of a state court
decision by the Supreme Court "could be barred by a petitioner's fail-
ure to raise his constitutional claims in the state courts. '"'' In addi-
tion, the Court specifically discussed a district court's ability to apply
the "could have raised" standard:
[T]he fact that we may not have jurisdiction to review a final state-
court judgment because of a petitioner's failure to raise his consti-
tutional claims in state court does not mean that a United States
district court should have jurisdiction over the claims. By failing to
raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to
obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court. '
The Feldman Court added one final caveat to the evolving
Rooker doctrine, derived from the case of Doe v. Pringle,'03 which also
dealt with denial of admission to the bar. The court in Doe held that a
district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a
state court's denial of a particular application to the state bar.'°4
According to Doe, however, a district court may exercise jurisdiction
over general constitutional challenges to state bar rules.'05 Feldman
distinguished Doe, stating that general constitutional challenges to
state bar rules do not require a district court to review a final state
court judgment in a judicial proceeding.' 6 This aspect of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine alone does not provide Texaco with federal
jurisdiction.'07
100. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16.
101. Id.; see also Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969) ("[T]he Court will not
decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first time on review of state court
decisions."); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 435 (1959) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction requires that a party explicitly and timely insist in state court that a state
statute, as applied, is repugnant to the Constitution).
102. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16 (emphasis
added).
103. 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
104. Id. at 599.
105. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485; Doe v. Pringle,
550 F.2d at 599.
106. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485 (jurisdiction
granted over general challenges to the District's rule, but not over challenges to particularized
decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adjudicating a party's right to practice
law).
107. The court of appeals determined the constitutionality of the Texas lien and bond
provisions as applied to Texaco, and not as a constitutional challenge on their face. The court
considered only the "unique and extraordinary circumstances of this case, which are unlikely
ever to recur because here obtaining a $12 billion bond is impossible." Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co., 784 F.2d at 1150. But even if Texaco had brought a general challenge to Texaco's bond
requirement, there is no question that a Texas ruling on such a facial challenge is a judicial
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B. Pennzoil's Arguments Against Federal Jurisdiction
Pennzoil contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all of
Texaco's claims in federal court, because the only courts empowered
to entertain claims of constitutional error in a Texas state court judg-
ment are the Texas appellate courts and the Supreme Court of the
United States. Derivatively, lower federal courts possess no power to
directly review state court decisions. The court of appeals held the
doctrine to bar those claims actually raised in state court, and ordered
dismissal of such claims on this basis. Pennzoil asserts, however, that
Rooker-Feldman should be read more broadly, to preclude federal
review of claims that a litigant could have raised in a state court pro-
ceeding, as well as those that actually were. 10 8 Pennzoil also argued
that by failing to construe Rooker-Feldman to bar Texaco's two addi-
tional claims not raised in state court, the court of appeals awarded
federal jurisdiction through "the simple expedient of failing to raise a
question in a state proceeding-thereby precluding, by definition, the
characterization of subsequent collateral federal district court consid-
eration of that question as appellate 'review.' "109
Pennzoil further claims that because section 1257 provides for
Supreme Court review of "judgments" or "decrees" (as opposed to
claims or issues), and because the enforceability of the judgment that
Pennzoil obtained in Texas is the very matter that the state court pur-
ported to review in Texaco's motion for j.n.o.v., the judgment is nec-
essarily inextricably intertwined with its enforcement." Texaco, on
proceeding. Thus, the limited "general challenge" exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
cannot possibly apply in this context.
For cases mounting general challenges to the constitutionality of a rule or provision
within the scope of Feldman, see Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 862 (1986) (Although a particular challenge comprised much of the
complaint, the intertwining of this challenge with a general attack on the constitutionality of
the rule governing admission of foreign-licensed attorneys to the bar was not so inextricable
that the district court could not consider it.); Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110,
118 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (Federal court had jurisdiction over claims that
a state bar's residency requirement was unconstitutional in all cases.); Howell v. State Bar of
Tex., 710 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984) (petitioner only
collaterally estopped from posing a general federal challenge to state disciplinary proceedings,
not a facial attack).
108. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1144.
109. Brief for Appellant at 40, Texaco (No. 85-1798).
110. Id. at 41. Pennzoil further argues that courts have not exclusively limited the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to those cases in which a federal court is specifically asked to reverse the
result of a state court adjudication. That would limit the application of the doctrine to mere
issue preclusion. Id. at 41 n.39; see, e.g., Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986)
(applying Feldman and finding that complaints regarding the decree of a state court were
inextricably intertwined with questions of the validity of that decree, and thus not reachable by
a federal court); Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3531 (1985) (A deliberate bypass of state procedures should not entitle a party to a "review of
TEXACO, INC. v. PENNZOIL CO.
the other hand, maintains that constitutional claims are inextricably
intertwined with state court decisions only when they can be decided
by direct review of the state court decision."'
The court of appeals rebuffed Pennzoil's arguments, finding fed-
eral jurisdiction through analysis of a litigant's ability to obtain relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It held that interpreting the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine and 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as barring Texaco's constitutional
claims would limit a party's ability to seek relief under this statute
because most claims brought under section 1983 could be raised in a
related state proceeding. 1 2 The court found this neutralization of the
statute's operability to run contrary to section 1983's purpose: to
allow the federal courts to protect people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law.
11 3
C. Analysis of Rooker-Feldman's Reach
The Second Circuit denied the existence of any support for
Pennzoil's "could have raised" argument," 4 and dismissed the possi-
bility that Texaco's federal claims are inextricably intertwined with its
state claims, without the benefit of discussion. 15 The court failed to
mention, however, that the Feldman decision specifically addressed
the "could have raised" and "inextricably intertwined" issues, appar-
ently resolving them in Pennzoil's favor.1 16 Furthermore, federal
courts that have addressed the issue"' since Feldman and prior to
Texaco, have upheld this nuance of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
that failure of a plaintiff to secure a final state court judgment "may
forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court decision in any
his constitutional claims by a federal district court that would have been unavailable to him if
he had pursued his claim to final state court judgment.").
II 1. Brief for Appellee at 45, Texaco (No. 85-1798).
112. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1144.
113. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880). Courts also have interpreted the statute
as providing "dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal system, enabling the plaintiff
to choose the forum in which to seek relief." Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,
506 (1982); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) ("Section 1983 opened the
federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under
the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the
Nation.").
114. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1144.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
117. Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472, 473 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 343 (1985);
Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3531 (1985);
Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210
(1984); Rosquist v. Jarat Const. Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (D.N.J. 1983); Michaelis v.
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 566 F. Supp. 89, 93 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 717 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1983).
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federal court."' 18
In Wood v. Orange County,1 19 the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit discussed the "could have raised" expansion of the doc-
trine undertaken in Feldman, holding this standard to apply only
where the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise a federal
claim in state proceedings. 120 The court in Wood reasoned that where
a plaintiff has had no such opportunity, it cannot fairly be said that
the plaintiff "failed" to raise the issue. 121
The Feldman decision, however, left open to conjecture the role
of the "inextricably intertwined" test in Rooker-Feldman preclusion.
Yet, the maxim that a federal court has no jurisdiction over issues
that are "inextricably intertwined with allegations underlying the
judgment of a state supreme court"'122 holds true even when the chal-
lenger asserts a constitutional claim.
1 23
"Inextricably intertwined" and "could have raised" are not nec-
essarily synonymous, however, and the Feldman Court mentioned
both. 24 Feldman presents two alternative resolutions to uncertainties
regarding the extent of Rooker-Feldman preclusion. The doctrine
may preclude all federal claims that a litigant could have raised in
state court, even though they are not inextricably intertwined with
those that actually were. Under this reasoning, even if an attack on
the bond is not inextricably intertwined with Texaco's previous attack
on the judgment in Texas state court, a federal district court is pre-
cluded from exercising jurisdiction if Texaco procedurally could have
launched such an attack on the bond while in state court Or, the
118. See supra text accompanying note 102.
119. 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
120. Id. at 1547; see also University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3226 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966)). Wood deviates
from earlier Fifth Circuit interpretations of the Rooker doctrine, which held that Rooker was
triggered when the effect of a federal decision favorable to the plaintiff would be to nullify or
modify the state court judgment, regardless of whether the plaintiff had a reasonable
opportunity to raise those claims. See, e.g., Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652
F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. Unit B, Aug. 1981); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); Warriner v. Fink, 307 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 943 (1963); Manufacturers Record Publishing Co. v. Lauer, 268 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959).
121. The court also said that when there is no reasonable opportunity to raise the issue, it is
not, therefore, inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment. Wood v. Orange
County, 715 F.2d at 1547.
122. Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1310 n.5 (11 th Cir.), stay denied, 107 S. Ct. 5 (1986).
123. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held in several cases that litigants
are unable to challenge state court judgments by filing civil rights suits in lower federal courts.
Brinkmann v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1986); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir.
1986); Sawyer v. Overton, 595 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1979); Kimball v. Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283
(5th Cir. 1980).
124. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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doctrine may only preclude federal jurisdiction over claims that could
have been raised in state court and which are inextricably intertwined
with those that actually were. If courts apply the two terms concur-
rently, then Rooker-Feldman is much narrower than Pennzoil would
prefer,' 25 because Pennzoil must demonstrate that Texaco's state
court attack on the judgment is inextricably intertwined with an
attack on the bond.
It may already be apparent that the syllogism presented above is
somewhat flawed. If the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal
court from exercising jurisdiction over any claim that a litigant proce-
durally could have raised in a prior state court trial, then the scope of
that preclusion certainly engulfs the narrower preclusion of issues
inextricably intertwined with those litigated in state court. This
assumes, of course, that there was an available procedural mechanism
for a litigant to raise the inextricably intertwined issue in state court,
which is Pennzoil's position. Consequently, if the "could have raised"
standard is a separate test to determine the scope of issues precluded
from federal consideration-not merely a check on the inextricably
intertwined test-then the inextricably intertwined test essentially
becomes superfluous. Given this conclusion, perhaps the appropriate
course is to assume that the Court in Feldman would not have articu-
lated a superfluous test, and that federal jurisdiction is only precluded
over issues inextricably intertwined with those actually litigated in a
state court that provided procedures for a litigant to contest the pre-
cluded issues.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Robinson v.
Ariyoshi 126 apparently1" adopted this approach to Rooker-Feldman.
Although the Supreme Court has vacated and remanded this decision,
the Court apparently did so on the merits and not on jurisdictional
grounds, and at the very least Robinson is a useful benchmark. The
Robinson court determined whether federal constitutional claims that
the state court had refused to consider on a petition for rehearing
were inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment. The
court deemed the crucial components to the inextricably intertwined
test to be "consideration" and "decision."' 2 8 If both of these elements
125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
126. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986).
127. In Robinson, the court of appeals provided guidance as to how to apply the
"inextricably intertwined" component of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It is doubtful,
however, that the court regarded Rooker-Feldman as a jurisdictional doctrine independent of
res judicata, as the two were said to be "two sides of the same coin." Thus, it seems that rather
than clarifying the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the ninth circuit further confused
the issue. Id. at 1472.
128. Id.
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are present, then federal review is impermissible. If the state court
did not previously consider the federal claim, however, or if the deci-
sion given was ambiguous, then it is unlikely that those claims actu-
ally presented to the state court are so inextricably intertwined with
subsequent federal claims that a district court cannot take
jurisdiction.1
29
The Ninth Circuit recently complemented the Robinson decision
in Worldwide Church of[G-d] v. McNair.3 ° The McNair court held
that when a district court is unable to evaluate a plaintiff's constitu-
tional claims without reviewing the state court's legal determinations
and the jury's verdict, then that court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
due to Rooker-Feldman preclusion.' 3 ' The court did not indicate
whether issues not inextricably intertwined with the state court judg-
ment are precluded from federal jurisdiction if a litigant could have
raised them. The Feldman test has been described as determining the
extent of Rooker-Feldman preclusion through a "realistic considera-
tion of the nature of the underlying claim," rather than a "mechanical
classification of the relief requested."'
' 32
Since Feldman, many federal courts of appeals that have applied
the doctrine have used the "inextricably intertwined" standard to
measure the scope of the Doe v. Pringle 1133 caveat to the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine. '34 This inquiry centers upon determining which claims
present general facial attacks on state bar admission requirements,
and which present claims attacking their specific application. Yet
Feldman failed to provide a "bright line" rule to distinguish claims
that are inextricably intertwined with a state court's judgment and
those that are not. '35
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit attempted to eluci-
date Feldman's inextricably intertwined standard in Razatos v. Colo-
rado Supreme Court.'36 In Razatos, the plaintiff had attacked the
129. Id.
130. 805 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. Id. at 892-93.
132. Carbonell v. Louisiana Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 772 F.2d 185, 189 (5th
Cir. 1985).
133. 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
134. See, e.g., Nordgren v. Hafter, 789 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 177
(1986); Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 343 (1985); Thomas v.
Kadish, 748 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3531 (1985); Lowrie v.
Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983); Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 710 F.2d 1075 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
135. Worldwide Church of [G-d] v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986); Razatos v.
Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016
(1985).
136. 746 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1984).
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constitutionality of certain Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, pre-
scribing how disciplinary proceedings may be brought against attor-
neys. After the state court ruled against him, Razatos brought a
section 1983 claim in federal court asserting that the application of a
different rule (not challenged in state court), within the same subject
area, violated his right to due process. The Razatos court concluded
that a district court does not have jurisdiction to hear a claim when it
would "have to go beyond mere review of the state rule as promul-
gated, to an examination of the rule as applied by the state court to
the particular factual circumstances of [the plaintiff's] case."' 37
Under either the "inextricably intertwined" test or the "could
have raised" test, in order for Rooker-Feldman preclusion to apply,
the doctrine mandates that Texas must have had procedures available
for Texaco to challenge the bond. In addition to this investigation of
Texas procedures, 3 ' because federal courts have made "inextricably
intertwined" an integral part of the Rooker-Feldman test, the
Supreme Court, upon a determination that the doctrine applies, may
choose to determine whether Texaco's attack on the constitutionality
of the bond is inextricably intertwined with a similar attack on the
judgment.
D. Res Judicata
Courts often have used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine inter-
changeably with res judicata. '39 "Under res judicata, a final judgment
on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating issues
or bases of remedies that were or could have been raised in that
action" to vindicate a particular claim."4 The effects of former adju-
dication are also manifested in the form of issue preclusion.
Issue preclusion is simply the principle that later courts should
honor an earlier decision on a matter that actually has been liti-
137. Id. at 1433; see also Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners, 623 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir.
1980) (absent a request for the broad-based remedy of general declaratory relief, federal
complaint must be dismissed); Czura v. Supreme Court of S.C., 632 F. Supp. 267, 270 (D.S.C.
1986) (no federal jurisdiction where plaintiff could have brought challenges to a procedure,
where disbarment was a real possibility, in a previous forum). The court in Razatos, however,
found that the district court did not have to evaluate the decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court in order to evaluate the plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals therefore reversed the
district court's finding of lack of jurisdiction. Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d at
1434.
138. See infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
140. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S.
351, 352 (1876)) (emphasis added).
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gated. I4 1 It precludes the relitigation of issues actually and necessar-
ily decided in former judicial proceedings. 4 2  The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments speaks of res judicata as "claim preclusion"
and collateral estoppel as "issue preclusion."' 43
Claim preclusion, also known as "traditional res judicata,"
extends to the adjudication of all issues relevant to the same claim
between the same parties whether or not raised at trial.'" The
essence of the doctrine is that a final adjudication on the merits pre-
vents the parties from subsequently litigating an alternative ground
for relief arising out of the same claim, 14 5 thereby forcing parties to
raise certain matters in their first suit on pain of subsequent forfei-
ture'46 through the principles of "merger" and "bar."' 14 7 Res judicata
extinguishes "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defend-
ant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of con-
nected transactions, out of which the action arose."' 48
Congress, through its enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 in 1948,149
141. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4416 (1981).
142. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept., 691 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 908 (1983); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); see also Dennis v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 899 (1st Cir. 1984) (Collateral estoppel
"bars relitigation of any factual or legal issue that was actually decided in previous litigation
'between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.' ").
143. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 n.5 (1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 74 (Tent. Draft. No. 3, 1976)); see also Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10
(1979) ("Whereas res judicata forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously,
collateral estoppel treats as final only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a
prior suit.").
144. White v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. Unit A, Aug.
1981); Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d at 898; see also J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 615 (1985) (citing Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876)).
145. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 153; see also Roach v. Teamsters, 595 F.2d 446,
449 (8th Cir. 1979) (enunciated test was whether the wrong for which redress is sought is the
same for both actions).
146. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4406 (1981).
147. When a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is merged into the
judgment, meaning that the claim is extinguished and the judgment is substituted for the
claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 comment a (1982). When a judgment
is rendered in favor of the defendant, the judgment is generally a bar to subsequent action on
the claim. Id. § 17 comment b. See generally id. §§ 17-18.
148. Id. § 24(1).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides that "[T]he ... judicial proceedings of any court of
any such State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
state . . . from which they are taken." See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) ("Section 1738 embodies concerns of comity and
federalism that allow the States to determine, subject to the requirements of the statute and the
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specifically has required that all federal courts give preclusive effect to
state court judgments whenever the courts of the judgment rendering
state would be obligated to do so. Interestingly, the Court had not
decided directly 5' whether the preclusive aspects of res judicata and
collateral estoppel apply to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
until Allen v. McCurry. 15 At Willie McCurry's criminal trial in Mis-
souri state court, he invoked the fourth and fourteenth amendments
to suppress evidence seized by police. 152 After the trial court denied
the motion to suppress on these constitutional grounds, he was con-
victed. 5 3 McCurry then filed a section 1983 action in federal court,
complaining that the city of Saint Louis and its police department
conspired to violate his fourth amendment right to be free from an
unreasonable search and seizure.' 54 The Court said that in addition
to preventing McCurry from relitigating issues in his federal habeas
corpus action,5 5 his state court loss on the fourth amendment issue
collaterally estopped his section 1983 claim. 156  The Court in Allen
conclusively determined that issues actually litigated in state courts
have the same preclusive effect in a subsequent section 1983 action in
federal court, as in the courts of the judgment rendering state.
15 7
After Allen, civil rights plaintiffs are prohibited from relitigating
any matters that a state court decided, as long as there was an oppor-
tunity for full and fair litigation.5 8 The Court, by looking to the leg-
Due Process Clause, the preclusive effect of judgments in their own courts."); see also Kremer
v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982) ("Section 1738 requires federal courts to
give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in
the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.").
150. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973), the Court impliedly approved of
several of the circuits' application of res judicata to civil rights actions brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970);
Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1964); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 716 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); cf Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975); Wolff v. McDowell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12
(1974).
151. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
152. State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
153. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 91.
154. Id. at 92.
155. The defendant McCurry was precluded from raising a search and seizure issue on a
federal habeas corpus petition. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) ("[W]here the state
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his or her trial.").
156. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 104-05.
157. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984).
158. Shapiro, The Application of State Claim Preclusion Rules in a Federal Civil Rights
Action, 10 OHio N.U.L. REV. 223, 226 (1983). The Allen decision is often thought of as a
response to the Supreme Court's increasing concern with an overburdened federal caseload.
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islative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, found no Congressional intent to
repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion.' 59 Absent a
"congressionally authorized exception to these principles of preclu-
sion,"' 16 1 the Court saw fit to reject the principle that "every person
asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity
to litigate that right in a federal district court."' 16 1, Opponents, how-
ever, regard section 1983 as the embodiment of a strong congressional
policy that it is necessary for federal courts to be the "primary and
final arbiters of constitutional rights,"'' 62 and thus would require a
clear congressional mandate before reading preclusion principles into
section 1983 claims.
The Court extended this holding to res judicata in Migra v. War-
ren City School District Board of Education. 163 Migra, an educational
supervisor, sued the board of education in state court for breach of an
employment contract as well as individual board members for wrong-
ful interference with her contract. The Ohio court ruled for Migra on
the contract claim but dismissed the tort claim.'64 She then filed a
section 1983 action in federal court. The Court held that because she
could have brought her constitutional claim in her original tort and
contract suit in state court, res judicata barred her from subsequently
maintaining such an action in federal court. 165 The state court judg-
See also Note, Allen v. McCurry: Collateral Estoppel as a Bar to Section 1983, 5 CRIM. JUST. J.
149, 165 (1981).
159. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 97-98.
160. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Collateral Estoppel in Section 1983 Actions, 95
HARV. L. REV. 280, 281 (1981).
161. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 103; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)
(Supreme Court has considered a section 1983 remedy to be supplementary to a state remedy).
162. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A commentator has
described the Court's decision in Allen as "giving lower federal courts tools for avoiding
federal civil rights litigation." Note, Preclusion in Section 1983 Actions after Allen and Migra.
Choice of Forum Considerations for the New York Civil Rights Complainant, 36 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1091, 1104 (1985); see also Comment, The Collateral Estoppel Effect to be Given State
Court Judgments in Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1492-93
(1980) (wooden application of collateral estoppel would frustrate a party's right of at least one
chance to litigate any constitutional issue in federal court).
163. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
164. Id. at 78-79.
165. Id. at 85. The question of whether claim preclusion is applicable to a section 1983
action had been answered in the affirmative by most federal courts of appeals that faced the
issue before the Migra decision. See, e.g., Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1983)
(dismissing a section 1983 suit because relevant transactions underlying both the state and
federal complaints were the same); Nilson v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983)
(1983 action barred by res judicata because substantive right sought to be vindicated was
presented in plaintiff's prior Title VII suit); see also Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th
Cir. 1982) (court saw no reason to distinguish between civil rights actions brought under
section 1983, and those brought under Title VII, the latter having been previously held subject
to resjudicata); Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928 (1982)
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ment had the same claim preclusive effect in federal court that it
would have had in the state courts.
166
Professor Wright has noted that there is still an uncertain area in
the application of res judicata to section 1983 claims-defendant pre-
clusion. 167 "This is whether a state court defendant will be precluded
from bringing a federal civil rights action based on constitutional
arguments that he could have used as a defense, but did not, in state
court."' 16 8 This factual setting, of course, is the very one posed by the
Texaco litigation. Perhaps it should make a difference that Texaco, as
well as all state court defendants, was haled into court involuntarily.
While the involuntary nature of state court litigation made no differ-
ence in Allen, that case only upheld collateral estoppel, not the more
expansive preclusion of res judicata. 16 9
E. Comparison of Rooker-Feldman with Traditional Preclusion
Courts have obscured Rooker-Feldman by viewing it as an appli-
cation of res judicata. 7 ° Professor Chang opines that the preclusion
(preference for finality was not outweighed by any compelling considerations of a section 1983
claim); Robbins v. District Court of Worth County, Iowa, 592 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 852 (1979) (Where federal section 1983 claim was based on the same nucleus
of operative fact as before the Iowa state court, plaintiffs were unable to circumvent claim
preclusion.); Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976) (court of appeals rejected the notion that unless a civil rights claim had actually been
raised in state court, it was not barred by res judicata); Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93, 99
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975) (Allowing plaintiff to bring section 1983 claims in
federal court, where judgment on the claim had been rendered by Oklahoma Supreme Court,
"would work a disservice to the salutary policies underlying res judicata.").
A minority of courts had previously held claim preclusion to be ineffectual in a section
1983 proceeding. See, e.g., New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Lombard v. Board of Educ. of New York, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975); Mack v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 960 (1971).
166. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. at 85. The Court deemed it
more important to give full faith and credit to state court judgments than to ensure separate
forums for federal and state claims. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court later expanded the Migra
rule, holding that federal courts must apply the issue and claim preclusion law of the forum
state to agency decisions rendered in quasi-judicial proceedings, in addition to traditional state
court litigation. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3226 (1986).
167. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4414 n.7 (1981). Professor Wright's reasoning implies that defendant preclusion may apply
to situations analogous to Texaco, where the original state court defendant brings a subsequent
federal action to assert federal constitutional claims omitted from the prior state court action.
For a discussion of the relationship between state judgments and federal civil rights laws, see
generally id. § 4471.
168. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A, at 693 (4th ed. 1983).
169. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
170. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3269
(1986) ("[W]e have read Rooker not as a jurisdictional barrier but as an application of res
judicata."); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425 (2d Cir. 1978) (due process claims that were
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of claims under Rooker is virtually identical in scope to the claim pre-
clusion of res judicata. 171 Numerous courts have explained the
Rooker-Feldman syllogism as follows: Federal courts are prohibited
from acting as appellate courts of the states.1 72 In fact, Congress spe-
cifically defined federal courts with limited jurisdiction, and it only
granted original jurisdiction to the district courts. 7 3 Thus, Rooker-
Feldman bars an action brought to a federal district court seeking
review of a prior state decision as "appellate," because the proper ave-
nue would have been to seek review in a court that has explicitly been
granted appellate jurisdiction.
The preclusion of claims under res judicata proceeds much the
same way. Because res judicata applies only when a final judgment is
rendered,' 74 claims barred by res judicata cannot be brought again as
original actions simply based upon an alternative legal theory. Where
res judicata bars an action involving review from state to federal
court, Rooker-Feldman would likewise bar the action. Professor
Chang maintains that although Rooker and res judicata describe the
same concept, courts historically have treated the two differently. 175
If Rooker-Feldman only bars federal consideration of "claims"
that are inextricably intertwined with claims litigated in state court,
then its scope perfectly matches that of res judicata. This conclusion
is justified because res judicata similarly bars federal consideration of
any unasserted "remedy" with respect to the transaction out of which
the state court claim arose.176 The key assumption is that in a factual
context such as Migra, Rooker-Feldman would preclude a district
court from considering the section 1983 "claim" as it was inextricably
intertwined with the state court, state law claims. In Migra, of
course, the res judicata explanation was that the section 1983 suit is
simply a separate "remedy" to redress the same "claim" that the
fully adjudicated barred by res judicata; Rooker cited as support); see also Williams v.
Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 99 n.l 1 (3d Cir.
1973); Francisco Enters., Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 916 (1974).
171. Chang, supra note 58, at 1354. But see Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal
Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 88-89 n. 143 (1982)
(preferable approach to state-to-federal preclusion is full faith and credit).
172. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416. But see supra note 55.
173. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982). This section goes on to say,
however, that "for purposes of issue preclusion . .. 'final judgment' includes any prior
adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect." Id.
175. Chang, supra note 58, at 1354.
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment c, at 199 (1982).
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plaintiff pursued in state court.'"7 In short, the doctrines approximate
each other because inextricably intertwined claims will only arise out
of the same series of connected transactions.
But the Court may hold that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not only preclude federal jurisdiction over claims that are inextricably
intertwined with claims litigated in a state court. In other words,
using res judicata terminology, Rooker-Feldman may preclude federal
review of a separate claim that does not arise out of the series of con-
nected transactions that comprised the subject matter of the original
state court proceeding. This reasoning depends upon whether the
Feldman Court sought to preclude jurisdiction over separate claims
that a litigant did not raise in state court, and which are not inextrica-
bly intertwined with actually litigated state court claims, where that
party procedurally could have presented the separate claim to the
state trial court but simply chose not to do so. If the doctrine does in
fact preclude federal consideration of certain non-inextricably inter-
twined claims, then it definitionally extends beyond the scope of res
judicata, which only extinguishes unlitigated issues with respect to a
given series of connected transactions.
178
Whatever its scope, when Rooker-Feldman applies, a federal
court has no jurisdiction and must dismiss the action sua sponte
regardless of whether the federal defendant raised the claim in a
timely fashion. 179 Res judicata, on the other hand, is an affirmative
defense,' 8 ° which a defendant must plead in his answer to the com-
plaint,' 8' and ordinarily the court will not raise it on its own initia-
tive.' 82 If the defendant does not raise res judicata, he will be
presumed to have waived the defense, and the issue will be both
177. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. at 84-85.
178. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
179. Currie, supra note 90, at 324.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
181. 5 C. WRIGrT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1277 (1969).
182. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 617 (1985). While the
following cases all acknowledge the general principle that a court will not raise an affirmative
defense sua sponte that a party has not pleaded, qualifying language abounds. Baylor Univ.
Medical Center v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, 1057 n.8 (5th Cir. 1985) (court of appeals not
prevented from considering an affirmative defense not raised below where the district judge sua
sponte chose to address the issue); Prinz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F.2d 692, 694 (3d
Cir. 1983) (Under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), issues tried by express or implied consent of the
parties shall be treated as if they had been raised in the pleadings.); Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d
435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980) (sua sponte dismissal on res judicata grounds by a district judge is
permissible and in the interest of judicial economy where both actions were brought before the
same court): Willis v. Fournier, 418 F. Supp. 265, 267 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th
Cir. 1976) (Both parties submitted briefs to the court, after the court informed them of a res
judicata issue, thereby creating no prejudice to the plaintiff.); see also Carbonell v. Louisiana
Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 772 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1985) (A district court may
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ignored, 8 3 and made unavailable on appeal. 184  On the other hand,
Rooker-Feldman, as noted, precludes jurisdiction despite the failure of
a federal defendant to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction. This
arguably avoids the waste of judicial resources and federal-state fric-
tion that may occur when preclusion depends upon the diligence of
the defendant's attorney. Furthermore, Professor Currie explains
that because the interests embodied in section 1257's exclusivity are
federal, Rooker-Feldman provides for a limited and uniform federal
law of preclusion in cases where state laws may vary. 185
One clear difference between traditional preclusion doctrines and
Rooker-Feldman preclusion is that the former depend upon a statute-
by-statute comparison with 28 U.S.C. § 1738, while the latter sweep-
ingly precludes jurisdiction because it is based on an interpretation of
28 U.S.C. § 1257. The upshot of Allen and Migra is that both collat-
eral estoppel and res judicata preclude a federal court from entertain-
ing an otherwise valid section 1983 claim (leaving aside the issue of
defendant res judicata preclusion). But this conclusion does not in
itself tell one whether these preclusion doctrines apply to other statu-
tory civil rights schemes, or indeed any independent ground of federal
jurisdiction.
In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corporation,8 6 for instance,
only raise res judicata sua sponte where both actions are brought in courts of the same district,
and where essential justice mandates it.).
183. "Generally, a failure to plead an affirmative defense results in the waiver of that
defense and its exclusion from the case." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 181, § 1278;
see Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (Although a district
court is granted the discretion to allow late amendments to press a defense when no prejudice
would result to the other party, equity and the purposes underlying collateral estoppel militate
strongly against allowing the defense to be asserted after trial.); Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor
Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 507 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (Res judicata is an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded in trial court and will not be considered for the first time on appeal.). See generally
Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 298 n.l (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Zeligson v. Hartman-Blair, Inc., 135 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1943).
Professor Chang suggests that Rooker may be viewed as changing the concept of res
judicata, implying that because of the identical claim preclusive effect of the two doctrines, res
judicata can never be waived. Regardless of whether the federal defendant raises res judicata
as an affirmative defense, the federal court must look to the law of the rendering state, and if
res judicata would be applied by the state courts, then the federal court must dismiss the
action. Thus, there are not two doctrines but rather only one, a jurisdictional type of res
judicata. Chang, supra note 58, at 1354-55 n. l10.
184. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1388 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 298 n.l (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); see also Coleman v. Frierson, 607 F. Supp. 1566, 1574 (N.D. 111.
1985) (defense of res judicata may not be raised for the first time after judgment has been
entered and the record established).
185. Currie, supra note 90, at 324.
186. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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the Court applied Allen's reasoning by analogy to a Title VII'87 claim,
to note that "[t]here is no claim here that Title VII expressly repealed
§ 1738."I1811 Yet the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is premised upon
neither an interpretation of section 1738, nor of any particular basis of
jurisdiction, such as section 1983. Instead, the doctrine's reliance
upon section 1257 indicates that it works in a broad brush fashion,
roughly analogous in scope to res judicata and collateral estoppel, to
preclude federal trial court jurisdiction whenever a litigant had a full
and fair hearing in state court.
F. Should the Court Disregard Rooker-Feldman?
The principle set forth by Rooker-Feldman, that "an inferior fed-
eral court... may not act as an appellate tribunal for the purpose of
overruling a state court judgment."'' 8 9 serves a useful, but limited pur-
pose. Due to Pennzoil's failure to raise res judicata as an affirmative
defense in the district court,' 90 Rooker-Feldman was the only means
by which the court of appeals could have held that the attack on the
constitutionality of the state court judgment, actually raised in state
court, did not warrant a federal forum. This portion of Texaco's fed-
eral complaint' 9' is surely an attempt to invoke a district court's
appellate jurisdiction, a power that Congress has yet to convey.
Yet, to call this an "appellate doctrine," which bars a federal
district court from acting as an appellate tribunal, is a misnomer. In
Rooker, an adverse ruling in a state court contract action, based solely
upon state law grounds, prompted the plaintiff to file a federal lawsuit,
with relief sought on federal constitutional grounds. In Feldman, a
bar applicant sought a discretionary waiver of a bar admission
requirement, not premised on a federal right. An adverse decision by
a District of Columbia court led to a federal complaint, seeking relief
on federal constitutional and statutory grounds. It is apparent that
neither Feldman nor Rooker is an example of an appellate attack, as
one cannot appeal claims that were not litigated below. 9 2 Rather,
these cases, and most probably that portion of Texaco's federal com-
plaint attacking the constitutionality of the bond, are examples of res
187. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
188. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. at 468.
189. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1142.
190. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
192. "It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create the cause." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
judicata claim splitting,' 93 where a state court litigant simply failed to
raise federal grounds for relief in state court despite the procedural
ability to do so.
Yet the fact that the Court chose to describe Rooker and Feld-
man as "appellate," forces one to consider whether the Court should
completely overrule that interpretation. Feldman's extension of the
doctrine, to preclude jurisdiction over claims not litigated below, pro-
vides clear evidence that the doctrine has branched far beyond its
articulated purpose. In addition, if the doctrine shares the same scope
as res judicata, then it is of marginal utility, only serving as a means of
preclusion where a party has waived that affirmative defense. 94
V. APPLICATION OF THE Rooker-Feldman DOCTRINE
Federal claims that a litigant could have raised in
state court (Texaco).
LFederal claims that a litigant could have raised in
state court that are inextricably intertwined with
those state claims (Migra).
Federal claims that a litigant was unable to raise in
state court.
Federal claims that a litigant was unable to raise in
state court that are inextricably intertwined with
those state claims (Allen).
A. Texas Procedure and the "Could Have Raised" Test
After having determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies in Texaco, the Supreme Court must determine whether Texas
193. RiS]ATEMi'NT (SECOND) O: JUIDGMIFNTS §§ 24-26 (1982).
194. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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procedure provided a means by which Texaco could have challenged
the constitutionality of the Texas bond and lien provisions. The court
of appeals dismissed the possibility of Texaco's attacking the bond
while in state court, by positing that "the likelihood of obtaining a
definitive constitutional ruling in the short period of time available to
it appears extremely slim, at least without full cooperation on the part
of Pennzoil."' 95 Rather than speculate as to how Texas law may be
accessed to mount this challenge, which is what the court of appeals
did, it is necessary to determine whether Texaco had the substantive
right to an affordable stay pending appeal, as well as whether "state
procedural law barred presentation of [Texaco's] claims."'
96
The "open-courts" provision of the Texas Constitution gives
Texaco the substantive right to challenge the state's bond and lien
provisions, as effectively denying its state created right to appeal. 197
In Dillingham v. Putnam,19 8 the Supreme Court of Texas held that a
legislative act that requires a party to give a supersedeas bond, with-
out reference to the ability or inability of the party to give such a
bond, is violative of the Texas Constitution's "open-courts" clause. 199
The Texas trial court restrained Pennzoil from enforcing the
judgment for three-and-one-half months after its entry, or from
December 10, 1985 until March 25, 1986.20  Texaco had at least one
possible procedural remedy during that period. Pennzoil filed a stipu-
lation, offering to waive its right to full bond, and asked instead for
the court to adopt suitable security as provided by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 2 1' Neither the Texas trial judge nor Texaco
195. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1139.
196. Brief for Appellant at 25, Texaco (No. 85-1798) (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
430, 432 (1979)).
197. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13 provides that "[A]II courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law."
198. 109 Tex. 1, 14 S.W. 303 (1890).
199. Id. at 1, 14 S.W. at 305; see also Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984)
(legislature has no power to make a remedy by due course of law contingent on an impossible
condition); Pace v. McEwen, 604 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (intermediate appellate
court enjoined enforcement of a trial court order that effectively rendered the appeal
meaningless).
200. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
201. On December 20, 1985, Pennzoil filed the following stipulation in the District Court of
Harris County, Texas:
Pennzoil stipulates and agrees that, if Texaco seeks to supersede or stay the
enforcement of this judgment and it makes provisions to secure the judgment
which the Texas courts determine would meet the standards of FED. R. Civ. P.
62, Pennzoil will be bound by any stay that the Texas courts enter based on a
finding that Texaco has provided security which meets the standards of FED. R.
Civ. P. 62.
Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at A129, Texaco (No. 85-1798).
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accepted this offer. 20 2
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure offer additional methods by
which Texaco could have sought relief while in state court. One pos-
sibility is that Texaco could have perfected its appeal, upon the trial
judge's entering the judgment, by filing a relatively nominal cost
bond.2 ° 3 Once perfected, the Court of Civil Appeals "may review for
excessiveness the amount of the bond or deposit fixed by the trial
court and may reduce the amount if found to be excessive.
' 2°4
Because of the "stand-still" status of Pennzoil's claim,20 5 Texaco
probably could have expedited this procedure without fear of
Pennzoil's executing on the judgment.
Furthermore, Texaco may have been able to bypass the bond
rule's grasp 2 6 by showing the trial court that it was equitably entitled
to remedial relief in the form of a stay of judgment.20  Rather than
address the possibility of Texaco's implementation of any of these
procedures, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed
only the remedy of state court mandamus,20 though not in the con-
text of Rooker-Feldman, but in terms of the "adequate state remedy"
component of the Younger v. Harris 20 9 abstention doctrine. The court
dismissed this alternative as unable to provide Texaco with an ade-
quate and timely state remedy.21 °
202. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1140.
203. TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 363 (Vernon 1985) (current version at TEX. R. App. P. ANN.
r. 40 (Vernon 1986)).
204. TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 365(b) (Vernon 1985) (current version at TEX. R. App. P.
ANN. r. 49 (Vernon 1986)); see Man-Gas Transmission Co. v. Osborne Oil Co., 693 S.W.2d
576, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) (trial court's setting bond in a grossly inequitable amount
would often defeat the appellant's right to suspend judgment pending appeal).
205. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
206. Rule 364 was amended in 1984 to begin: "Unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules .... Appellants argue that section 65.013 of the Civil Practice and Remedy Code will
allow the trial court to stay the judgment because this statute falls within the recently added
qualifying language of the Rule. See Brief for Appellant at 29 n.I, Texaco (No. 85-1798) (citing
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.013 (Vernon 1986).
207. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.013 (Vernon 1986).
208. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (Vernon 1986) (providing for issuance of all
writs of quo warranto and mandamus by the supreme court or a justice of the supreme court).
In addition, section 22.221 of the Government Code permits an intermediate court of appeals
to issue all writs of mandamus against a judge of a district or county court. TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 22.221 (Vernon 1986); see also Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1969)
(writ of mandamus will be issued to direct a district judge to enter or set aside a particular
judgment or order when the directed course of action is the only proper course and the
petitioner has no other adequate remedy), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997 (1970).
209. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For a discussion of the court of appeals' application of Younger,
see supra note 28.
210. Texaco, Inc., v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1151-52.
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B. The "Inextricably Intertwined" Test
Texaco arguably had the substantive right and the procedural
ability to challenge the constitutionality of the bond and lien provi-
sions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine may21' require an evaluation of
the inextricable intertwining of the substance of the federal claims
with the previously raised state court claims. Professor Chang argued
that the doctrine's claim preclusion parallels res judicata,21 2 theo-
rizing without the benefit of the Feldman decision, which supports his
position if the inextricably intertwined standard equals the modern
transactional definition of claim
21 3 in res judicata.214
The issue becomes whether Texaco's challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the bond is inextricably intertwined with its prior chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the judgment. Analysis of federal
court applications of the test, namely Robinson
21 5 and McNair,2 1 6
yield the common denominator that if the federal court is required to
review a state court's particular findings of law and fact, then district
court review would be impermissible.2"7
These definitions seem to lend credence to Texaco's argument
against preclusion,218 because the Texas bond rule was not a part of
the proceeding in the Texas trial court, and a direct review of the
Texas trial would not reveal any discussion of the bond. Texaco's
challenge to the constitutionality of the bond as applied, however,
may necessarily require review of the state court's proceedings,
because in Texas, the amount of the bond equals the amount of the
bond.21 9 Consequently, review of the trial record is the only way to
determine the propriety of the amount of the bond. Therefore, Tex-
aco's federal claims conceivably could be inextricably intertwined
with its state court claims, and beyond the scope of district court
review.
To the extent that an attack on the supersedeas bond is inter-
twined with Texaco's previous attack on the judgment, then the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine definitely precludes federal jurisdiction.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 124-38.
212. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. A district court in New Jersey has argued
that the Migra decision obviated the need to apply an "inextricably intertwined" test, as Migra
simply requires a court to import the res judicata standards of the forum state. Randolph v.
Lipscher, 641 F. Supp. 767, 781 n.8 (D.N.J. 1986).
213. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
215. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986).
216. Worldwide Church of [G-d] v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1986).
217. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 25.
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Likewise, if the bond challenge arises out of the entire series of trans-
actions associated with the judgment, then res judicata would have
prevented federal court consideration, if Pennzoil had raised that
defense. But if the bond is not so intertwined, then preclusion is only
appropriate if the Court adopts the more expansive interpretation of
Feldman, that all claims that a litigant could have raised in state court
are precluded. Even if Pennzoil had asserted res judicata as a defense
to Texaco's federal court bond challenge, that doctrine would not
have prevented federal consideration if the bond requirement did not
arise out of the series of transactions out of which the judgment arose,
i.e., if it is not inextricably intertwined with the judgment.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp. 220 indicates that the Court may indeed adopt this latter
approach to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's scope. In Cohen, the
Court considered the appealability of a district court order refusing to
follow a New Jersey statute that required certain shareholders to post
a bond in order to file a derivative action.221 The problem was that 28
U.S.C. § 1291222 only allows appeals from "final decisions of district
courts," and no final decision had been reached due to the dispute
about the applicability of the bond requirement in this diversity suit.
The Court held, however, that the bond was "in that small class
which finally determine claims of right separate from, and collateral
to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate considera-
tion be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. ' 223 The analogy
to the present litigation is easily drawn: The dispute regarding the
supersedeas bond is collateral to and separable from Texaco's previ-
ous attack on the judgment in Texas court. Given this conclusion, the
bond is not inextricably intertwined with the judgment.
If the Court adopts the above reasoning, it should be careful to
limit the scope of Rooker-Feldman preclusion to those cases where a
litigant had a full and fair opportunity to present his federal claims to
an unbiased state tribunal. 224 This caveat is critical, because res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel are already at work, preventing many civil
rights plaintiffs from reaching a federal forum. The Court should
undertake cautiously any further expansion of the preclusiveness of
state court judgments.
220. 337 U.S. 541 (1940).
221. Id. at 544-45.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
223. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546.
224. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in deciding Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. ,225
will have the opportunity to disentangle the numerous ambiguities
and inconsistencies of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It is crucial that
the Court analyze the preclusive effects of the doctrine in terms of the
policy it was designed to serve; federal district court deference to state
court proceedings. Only through adherence to this ideal, may courts
draw the proper inferences as to the doctrine's applicability, as well as
implement the proper test in its application.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as defined by numerous courts,
applies in Texaco. At the time that the Texas trial concluded, the
highest Texas court had not yet acted. Therefore, the doctrine's first
inference-that the Supreme Court as well as lower federal courts are
limited in their ability to entertain appeals from lower state court
decisions22 -is in effect. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is thus an
appropriate means of discerning whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over Texaco's section 1983 claims.
Given the applicability of the doctrine, the more difficult ques-
tion is how are courts to apply it? Federal courts in the post-Feldman
era have incorporated both components of the Feldman test-
whether the federal claims could have been raised in state court, as
well as whether they are substantively inextricably intertwined with
those claims actually raised in state court. A district court's finding
that both of these inquiries command affirmative responses should
compel it to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Both Texaco and Pennzoil have legitimate arguments addressing
the "inextricably intertwined" component of the Rooker-Feldman
test.227 If Texaco is successful, however, in arguing that because the
constitutionality of the bond was not addressed at the Texas trial, and
its federal and state claims are not inextricably intertwined, then the
Court will find that Rooker-Feldman does not preclude federal
jurisdiction.
Yet a conclusion that the federal district court had jurisdiction to
review the Texas judgment is completely at odds with the overarching
purpose of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: preventing federal courts
from interrupting the on-going business of state courts. Such an
incongruity may compel the Court to hold that the doctrine precludes
federal jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the bond
requirement because Texaco could have launched such an appeal
225. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
226. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes I10-11 and accompanying text.
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while in the Texas courts, even though the Court concludes this issue
is not inextricably intertwined with the judgment. One final hope is
that the Court will set the record straight, and declare that while
there is a need for the doctrine's declaration that, amongst federal
courts, only the Supreme Court can entertain "appeals" from state
court judgments, neither Rooker nor Feldman constituted appeals to
federal district courts.
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